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I. INTRODUCTION

One of the most prolific advancements in telecommunications
technology has been the development and widespread use of wireless
communication devices, such as cellular telephones.' The ubiquitous
presence of these devices has fundamentally changed the way people
conduct business and run their personal lives.2 Notwithstanding the
convenience and popularity of wireless communication, technological
developments in this field have had a profound impact on individual
privacy. Most notably, communications conducted on wireless devices are

1. The Cellular Telecommunications and Internet Association reports that there are over 112
million wireless phone subscribers in the United States alone and that there are an additional 45,924
new wireless subscribers everyday. CELLULAR TELECOMM. &INTERNET ASSOC., Frequently Asked
Questions and Fast Facts, at http:llwww.wow-com.omlconsumer/faq/articles.cfm?ID-97 (last
visited Mar. 16, 2002).
2. James X. Dempsey, CommunicationsPrivacyin the DigitalAge:Revitalizingthe Federal
Wiretap Laws to Enhance Privacy,8 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 65, 84 (1997) ("The rapid expansion

of wireless services, which are increasingly used not just by the wealthy and in business
applications, but by ordinary citizens for personal conversations, has made electronic
communication totally flexible and constantly available, yet also more insecure."); see also Cellular
Privacy: Is Anyone Listening? You Betcha!: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Telcomm., Trade,
and Consumer Prot. of the House Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. 5-6 (1997) [hereinafter

CellularPrivacyHearing](statement ofDel. Tom Bliley, Chairman, House Comm. on Commerce)
("Americans now have unprecedented convenience and ease ofmovement... when using wireless
phones. We are no longer tethered to the cord ....Cellular ...services have also improved the
).
bottom line... of U.S. businesses by adding efficiencies in cost and speed ....
3. WHITFIELD DIFFIE & SUSAN LANDAU, PRIVACY ON THE LINE: THE POLITICS OF
WIRETAPPING AND ENCRYPTION 1-3 (1998).
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notoriously susceptible to interception by individuals using advanced
eavesdropping equipment,4 including modified radio scanners.' Congress,
concerned with the advance of electronic eavesdropping and the
availability of hardware capable of defeating any expectation of privacy,6
enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA).7
This Act expanded Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 (Title III) 8 -the federal wiretap law-by making the
unauthorized interception9 and subsequent disclosure' ° of electronic
communications illegal."
Title III's prohibition against the intentional disclosure of the contents
ofillegally intercepted messages recognizes that disclosure compounds the
harmful effects of the initial interception. 2 Nevertheless, the disclosure
provisions in Title III have recently come under constitutional attack by
First Amendment advocates in two cases, decided first by the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 3 and second by the United States
Supreme Court. 4 Both cases involved the illegal interception of private
communications over cellular phones and the subsequent public disclosure
of those communications by media outlets.'"

4. S. REP. No. 99-541, at3 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3557.
5. See CellularPrivacyHearing,supra note 2, at 8-10 (testimony of Thomas E. Wheeler,
President, Cellular Telecomm. Ind. Assoc.); see also Derek D. Wood, Comment, The Emergence
of CellularandCordlessTelephones and the Resulting Effect on the Tension Between Privacyand
Wiretapping,33 GONZ. L. REV. 377, 383 (1997/1998).
6. It is estimated that between ten and twenty million scanners are currently in operation in
the United States. Kimberly R. Thompson, Cell Phone Snooping: Why ElectronicEavesdropping
Goes Unpunished,35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 137, 149 (1997).
7. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2510 etseq. (2000)). Congress noted that the "tremendous advances
in telecommunications and computer technologies have carried with them comparable
technological advances in surveillance devices and techniques," with the result that private
communications "may be open to possible wrongful use and public disclosure by... unauthorizedprivate parties." S. REP. No. 99-541, at 3 (1986).
8. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, Tit. III § 801,
82 Stat. 197,211 (1968) (as amended by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, Pub. L. No.
99-508, 100 Stat. 1848, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. (2000)).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1)(a)-(b) (2000).
10. Id. § 2511(l)(c)-(d).
11. Violations of Title III may result in the imposition of civil fines or may be prosecuted as
criminal offenses. Id. § 2511(4)-(5).
12. Brief for the United States at 39, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (Nos. 991687, 99-1728) ("Title III protects against the magnified harm that results when any illegally
intercepted conversation is disseminated to a wider audience.").
13. Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
14. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
15. Id. at 517-19; Boehner, 191 F.3d at 464-65.
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In Boehner v. McDermott," several Republican leaders of the House
of Representatives, including former House Speaker Newt Gingrich,
participated in a conference call to discuss potential responses to an ethics
probe of Speaker Gingrich. 7 Boehner, a Republican representative from
Ohio and Chairman of the House Republican Conference, participated in
the conference call from his cell phone while driving through Florida."
Unbeknownst to the conference call participants, a Florida couple had
intercepted Boehner's cellular transmission using a radio scanner and tape
recorded the conversation." The Florida couple determined that the tape
was politically damaging to the House Republicans and delivered it to
Representative McDermott, who at the time was the ranking Democratic
member of the House Ethics Committee.2" The day after he accepted the
tape, McDermott distributed copies to three major newspapers, 21 which
printed stories about the intercepted conversation.22
Boehner filed suit against McDermott, charging him with violating
Title III's anti-disclosure provision. 23 Boehner did not, however, file suit
against the newspapers that published the stories. The district court refused
to accept McDermott's First Amendment defense24 and instead held that
Title III's non-disclosure provision promoted freedom of speech25 and thus
was constitutional.26

16. 191 F.3d 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
17. Id. at 465.
18. Id.
19. Id. The couple first met with Democratic Representative Karen Thurman of Florida who
suggested they deliver the tape to McDermott. Id.They also discussed the possibility of receiving
immunity for their illegal interception of the call. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. McDermott gave copies to theNew York Times, the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, and
Roll Call. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. The relevant portion of the statute states, "Any person who intentionally discloses, or
endeavors to disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic
communication ... knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through
the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication.., shall be subject to suit .... ." 18
U.S.C. § 2511 (1)(c)-(d) (2000).
24. Boehner, 191 F.3d at 466-67. McDermott argued that he engaged in protected speech by
turning the taped conversation over to the media outlets. Id. The court declared that "when 'speech'
and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important
governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First
Amendment freedoms." Id. at 467 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968)).
25. Id. at 468. The court reasoned that "[i]nterception itself is damaging enough. But the
damage to free speech is all the more severe when illegally intercepted communications may be
distributed with impunity." Id.
26. Id. at 478.
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Conversely, the Supreme Court, pitting freedom of speech against
individual privacy," ruled in favor of the media defendants' rights to
publish an illegally intercepted conversation in Bartnicki v. Vopper.28 In
that case, Bartnicki was assigned as a negotiator in a contentious contract
dispute between a teachers' union and a school district in Pennsylvania.29
Bartnicki and the president of the local union engaged in a conversation
regarding the status of the negotiations. Bartnicki was using her cellular
phone, and the union president was using his convential home phone.30
The conversation was illegally intercepted and recorded by an unknown
person using a scanner that picked up Bartnicki's cellular signal.3 This
individual then delivered the recording to the head of a taxpayers'
organization opposed to the union's demands.32 The tape was later
delivered to Vopper, a radio commentator who had criticized the union in
played a tape of the intercepted conversation
the past.33 Vopper repeatedly
34
show.
talk
on his radio
Bartnicki and the union president filed suit against Vopper and the head
of the taxpayers' organization under Title III's proscription against
disclosing the contents of illegally intercepted messages.35 The Supreme
Court held that privacy concerns give way when balanced against the
interest in publishing matters of public importance.36 Determining that the
deferidants took no part in the illegal interception and obtained the
information lawfully, the Court concluded that a "stranger's illegal
conduct does not suffice to remove the First Amendment shield from
'
speech about a matter of public concern."37
Balancing free speech and privacy rights can be very complex,
considering that a presumptive preference for one set of rights will
inevitably lead to presumptive violations of the other set of rights. 38 These
27. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 532 (2001). The Court found the First Amendment
interest in publishing matters of public importance outweighed the conversants' privacy rights. Id.
28. Id. at 535.
29. Id. at 518.

30. Id.
31. Id. at 518-19.
32. Id.at 519. Yocum, the head of the taxpayers' organization, testified that he found the tape
in his mailbox shortly after the interception and recognized the voices ofBartnicki and the president
of the union. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 520.
36. Id. at 534.
37. Id. at 535. The Court declared that the months of negotiations over the proper level of
salary compensation for teachers were "unquestionably amatter of public concern, and respondents
were clearly engaged in debate about that concern." Id.
38. Nadine Strossen, ProtectingPrivacyandFreeSpeech in Cyberspace, 89 GEO. L.J. 2103,
2111 (2001).
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inherent conflicts notwithstanding, Congress clearly struck the balance in
favor of privacy by enacting Title III to protect against surreptitious
invasions of privacy and the magnified harm that results when an
unauthorized interception is disseminated to a wider audience.39 The
Supreme Court's decision in Bartnicki, however, undermines Title III's
strict statutory scheme40 amended to protect the privacy of electronic
communications. 4' In so doing, the Court not only strikes an improper
balance between free speech and privacy, but tramples upon the First
Amendment right to speak privately without fear of interception and
widespread dissemination. 2
This Note will address the tension between privacy and free speech in
the context of Title III and suggest that the Supreme Court's recent denial
of privacy perpetuates and exacerbates the denial of First Amendment
freedoms, particularly the right not to speak publicly.43 Part II of this Note
addresses the history of Title III and its judicial underpinnings. Part III
discusses the standard of review for content-neutral laws creating
incidental burdens on speech and how the Supreme Court essentially
abandoned this standard in Bartnickiin favor of strict scrutiny. Part IV will
focus on the Bartnicki and Boehner decisions in light of Supreme Court
precedent involving the media's use and publication of lawfully obtained,
truthful information concerning matters of public significance. Finally,
Part V addresses factors that should be considered in weighing the
competing privacy and free speech concerns in Title III and suggests that
Congress must enact stricter legislation that prevents the laundering of
illegally intercepted private conversations.

39. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
40. Title III provides a "comprehensive scheme for the regulation of wiretapping and
electronic surveillance." Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41,46 (1972); see alsoOmnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, Tit. III, § 801, 82 Stat. 197, 211 (1968)
(demonstrating that it was designed "to protect effectively the privacy of wire and oral

communications").
41. S. REP. No. 99-541, at 1 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3555.
42. "At the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide
for him or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence."
Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994).
43. Although "the 'essential thrust of the First Amendment is to prohibit improper restraints
on the voluntary public expression of ideas' there is 'a cdncomitant freedom not to speak publicly,
one which serves the same ultimate end as freedom of speech in its affirmative aspect."' Harper &
Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559 (1985) (quoting Estate of Hemingway v.
Random House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250, 255 (1968)).
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II. ELEcTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF COMMUNICATIONS: THE HISTORY
AND JUDICIAL UNDERPINNINGS OF TITLE III

A. Supreme CourtDecisions:Laying the Groundworkfor
Statutory Protection
Protection for the privacy of communications from governmental
intrusion stems primarily from the Fourth Amendment's ban against
unreasonable searches and seizures.' However, in Olmstead v. United
States,45 the Supreme Court held that evidence obtained from warrantless
wiretaps installed by federal agents did not involve any trespass into the
homes or offices of the defendants and thus did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. 6 The OlmsteadCourt "based Fourth Amendment protection
on common law property principles and was consistent with the then
prevailing view that the Fourth Amendment protected the individual's
home and property only, rather than individual privacy rights per se."47
Thus, since a telephone tap was not a trespass on the defendant's property,
and because nothing tangible was seized, the Court held that Fourth
Amendment protections did not extend to wiretapping.4" Justice Louis
Brandeis wrote a famous dissent, arguing that protections provided by the
Bill of Rights should adapt to social change and operate in light of
technological advancement.49
44. The Fourth Amendment asserts the "right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
45. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
46. Id. at 466. The Court held that an individual's Fourth Amendment rights could only be
violated if "there has been an official search and seizure of his person, or such a seizure of his
papers or his tangible material effects, or an actual physical invasion of his house ...for the
purpose of making a seizure." Id.
47. Jose L. Nunez, Regulating the Airwaves: The GovernmentalAlternative to Avoid the
CellularUncertaintyon PrivacyandtheAttorney-ClientPrivilege,6 ST. THoMAs L. REv. 479,481
(1994).

48. Olmstead,277 U.S. at 464-66.
dissenting). Brandeis stated:
49. Id. at 472 (Brandeis, J.,
Whenever a telephone line is tapped, the privacy of the persons at both ends of the
line is invaded and all conversations between them upon any subject, and although
proper, confidential and privileged, may be overheard. Moreover, the tapping of
one man's telephone line involves the tapping of the telephone of every other
person whom he may call or who may call him. As a means of espionage, writs
of assistance and general warrants are but puny instruments of tyranny and
oppression when compared with wire-tapping.
dissenting). He then synthesized certain privacy concepts and suggested
Id. at 475-76 (Brandeis, J.,
they be afforded constitutional protection under an expanded notion of the Fourth Amendment:
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Confronted with increasing developments in technology and a resulting
decrease in privacy, the Supreme Court, in Katz v. United States,5 ° held
that the Olmstead trespass doctrine was no longer viable for controlling
Fourth Amendment issues involving electronic government surveillance."
In Katz, the Court determined that evidence obtained from a warrantless
wiretap placed outside of a public telephone booth was inadmissible under
the Fourth Amendment. 2 The Court asserted that a person's "reasonable
expectation of privacy"" was protected from governmental intrusion by
the Fourth Amendment. 4 The Court, however, indicated that a short
surveillance, narrowly focused on the interception of a few conversations,
was constitutionally acceptable if approved by a magistrate in advance and
based on a special showing of need.
In the same year that Katz was decided, the Supreme Court addressed
the Fourth Amendment's application to court-ordered electronic
surveillance by government agents in Berger v. New York. 6 In Berger,the
Court concluded that New York's eavesdropping statute57 was "too broad

The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the
pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature,
of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure
and satisfaction of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.
They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone - the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect
that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy ofthe
individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of the
Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
50. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
51. Id. at 353. The Court declared that the Fourth Amendment protects people and not simply
areas, stressing that its reach cannot "turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into
any given enclosure." Id.
52. Id.
53. "What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office is not
a subject of FourthAmendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." Id. at 351.
54. Id. at 352-53.
55. Id. at 354-55.
56. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
57. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 813-a (1958), construedin Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41,
43 n.l (1967). The statute read, in pertinent part:
An ex parte order for eavesdropping... may be issued by any justice of the
supreme court orjudge.. . upon oath or affirmation of a district attorney, or of the
attorney-general or of an officer above the rank of sergeant of any police
department of the state.., that there is reasonable ground to believe that evidence
of crime may be thus obtained, and particularly describing the person or persons
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in its sweep," and thus would lead to "trespassory intrusion" in violation
of the Fourth Amendment.58 The Court condemned lengthy and
indiscriminate surveillance and laid the framework with respect to
constitutional requirements for court-ordered electronic surveillance.59
B. CongressionalResponse: Title III's Protectionof the Privacy of
Oral and Wire Communications
Congress responded to these Supreme Court decisions by codifying the
holdings of Katz and Berger in Title III.60 Title III generally proscribed the
interception and disclosure of oral and wire communications, 6 ' while
making provision for law enforcement to intercept these communications
for use in criminal investigations.62 According to the Senate report, the
legislation had "as its dual purpose (1) protecting the privacy of wire and

oral communications, and (2) delineating on a uniform basis the
circumstances and conditions under which the interception of wire and oral
communications may be authorized."63 By expressly prohibiting all forms

whose communications... are to be overheard or recorded... and, in the case of
a telegraphic or telephonic communication, identifying the particular telephone
number or telegraph line involved.
Id
58. Berger, 388 U.S. at 44.
59. Id. at 59-60. The Court outlined seven constitutional requirements for court-ordered
electronic surveillance: (1) there must be a probable cause showing that a particular offense has
been or is about to be committed; (2) the applicant must describe with particularity the
conversations to be intercepted; (3) the surveillance must be for a specific and limited period of
time in order to minimize the invasion of privacy; (4) there must be continuing probable cause
showings ifthe surveillance isto continue beyond the original termination date; (5) the surveillance
must cease once the evidence sought is seized; (6) notice must be given unless there is an adequate
factual showing of exigency; and (7) a return on the warrant is required so that the court may
oversee and limit the use of the intercepted conversations. Id.
60. See CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, WIRETAPPING AND EAVESDROPPING
§ 1:6, at 1-l1 (2d ed. 1995) (explaining that Congress enacted Title III in an effort to comport
electronic surveillance legislation with the procedural and substantive requirements set forth in Katz
and Berger).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 251 l(l)(a) (1968) (amended 1986). Title III not only applies to government
invasions of privacy, but also to "any person who willfully intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or
procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire or oral communication."
Id.
62. Id. § 2516. For purposes of this Note, focus will be placed on those provisions regarding
the interception and disclosure of wire or electronic communications. See 18 U.S.C. § 251 l(])(a)(d) (2000).
63. S. REP.No. 90-1097, at 66 (1968), reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112,2153.
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of unwarranted wiretapping and electronic surveillance, 6' Title III offered
protection against both public and private eavesdropping."
C. The ECPA: Protectingthe Privacy of Wireless Communications
As discussed in the introduction, it was not until the 1986 passage of
the ECPA, amending Title III, that Congress acted to provide privacy
protection to wireless communications. 6 Recognizing that no federal
statutory standards existed to protect the privacy and security of
communications transmitted by new forms of telecommunications
technology, Congress sought to reestablish federal privacy protections by
enacting the ECPA. 67 According to Congress, this gap in privacy
protection would likely discourage the use of innovative communications
systems and the development of new forms of telecommunications
technology. 6 The law, therefore, "must advance with the technology to
ensure the continued vitality of the fourth amendment. Privacy cannot be
left to depend solely on physical protection, or it will gradually erode as
technology advances."69
Consistent with the findings made by Congress, the amended version
of Title III broadly prohibits the interception and subsequent disclosure of
intercepted communications.7" First, the statute prohibits in broad terms
using, or attempting to use, the contents of certain communications,
knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained
through an illegal interception.7 To make certain that disclosure is
included among the prohibited uses of such communications, Title III
specifically proscribes "intentionally disclos[ing], or endeavor[ing] to
disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic
communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information
was obtained through... [unlawful] interception."'7 2 Taken together, these
two provisions make clear that all unauthorized uses of illegally
intercepted communication by anyone with knowledge or reason to know
of their unlawful origin is strictly prohibited.73

64. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2516 (1968) (amended 1986).
65. See NATIONAL WIRETAP COMMISSION, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE REPORT 38-40 (1976)

Title III was enacted in part as a reaction to public concerns regarding private wiretapping. Id.
66. S. REP. No. 99-541, at 2-3 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3556-57.
67. Id. at 5.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1)(d) (2000).
71.

Id. § 2511(1)(d).

72. Id.§ 2511(1)(c).

73. Brief for the United States at 6, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (Nos. 99-1687,
99-1728).
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In framing Title III, Congress realized that prohibiting interceptions
alone would be insufficient, considering that disclosure would serve to
compound the evil Congress sought to eliminate.74 Furthermore, it is not
enough to prohibit disclosure by only those who conduct the interception.'
"One would not expect [the interceptor] to reveal publicly the contents of
the communication; if they did so they would risk incriminating
themselves. It was therefore 'essential' for Congress to impose upon third
parties, that is, upon those not responsible for the interception, a duty of
non-disclosure."7 6 Thus, without a prohibition on unauthorized disclosures
of private conversations by third parties, Congress's purpose ofprotecting
the privacy of wire, oral and electronic communications would be
undermined.77
III. CONTENT-NEUTRAL LAWS: INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY AND THE
O'BPEN FRAMEWORK

The First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and freedom of the
press are among the most valued rights in American society today.78
Maintenance ofthese rights "against overreaching by the legislature or the
executive is among the judiciary's major and most demanding
responsibilities."79 Thus, where a statute is enacted that places restrictions
on the right to free speech and press, courts must apply a certain level of
scrutiny to determine whether the statute comports with constitutional
requirements against the suppression of unpopular ideas or disfavored
views."0
A. Standardof Review: DistinguishingBetween Content-Basedand
Content-NeutralLaws
Laws that attempt to stifle speech on account of its message are
generally subjected to strict scrutiny by the courts.8 Under this rigorous
74. Id. Without the prohibition on disclosure, there would be an incentive to conduct illegal
interceptions and the damage from such violations would be "compounded." Bartnicki v. Vopper,
200 F.3d 109, 133 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (PolIak, J., dissenting) (citing Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d
463, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).
75. Bartnicki, 200 F.3d at 133 (Pollak, L, dissenting) (citing Boehner, 191 F.3d at 470).
76. Id.
77. S. REP. No. 99-541, at 1-3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3555-57.
78. Bartnicki, 200 F.3d at 136 (Pollak, J., dissenting).
79. Id.
80. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,637 (1994). "[B]ecause not every interference
with speech triggers the same degree of scrutiny under the First Amendment, [the Courts] must
decide at the outset the [appropriate] level of scrutiny ..... Id.

81. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000); Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 871-72, 874 (1997); Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S.
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standard, content-based statutes are generally unconstitutional unless they
are "narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government interest. 82
Conversely, government regulation of speech or other expressive activities
for purposes and in a manner unrelated to the particular message or its
communicative aspects is subject to intermediate scrutiny83 because, in
most cases, it "pose[s] a less substantial risk of excising certain ideas or
viewpoints from the public dialogue. 84
1. The Three-Pronged O'Brien Framework
The intermediate scrutiny standard was formulated in UnitedStates v.
O'Brien,85 wherein the Supreme Court upheld a law prohibiting the
destruction of military draft cards against a First Amendment challenge.86
O'Brien burned his Selective Service registration certificate in protest of
the Vietnam War and argued that his actions were a form of protected
political expression. 7 Under intermediate scrutiny, the Court held that a
statute is sufficiently justified "if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance
89
of that interest." 8 The Court rejected O'Brien's First Amendment claim
and, applying intermediate scrutiny, held that the statute furthered
substantial governmental interests unrelated to the suppression of
expression and was not unnecessarily broad.9"
Thus, when a law is not hostile to the particular message being
conveyed and does not seek to abridge the communicative impact of
expression, 9 it is content-neutral and intermediate scrutiny should apply.92

115, 126 (1989).
82. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813.
83. See Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 642.
84. Id.
85. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
86. Id.at 386.
87. Id.at 376.
88. Id. The Court declared that "when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in
the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the
nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms." Id.
89. Id. "Even on the assumption that the alleged communicative element in O'Brien's
conduct is sufficient to bring into play the First Amendment, it does not necessarily follow that the
destruction of a registration certificate is constitutionally protected activity." Id.
90. Id. at 376-77,381-82. The Court concluded that the government had a substantial interest
in assuring the continuing availability of Selective Service certificates. Id. at 382. Because the
noncommunicative impact ofburning aregistration certificate frustrated the Government's purpose,
a governmental interest sufficient to convict O'Brien had been shown. Id.
91. The Court could not perceive any alternative means that would more precisely and
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Such laws, according to the Supreme Court, "do not pose such inherent
dangers to free expression, or present such potential for censorship or
manipulation, as to justify application of the most exacting level of First
Amendment scrutiny."93 Accordingly, in determining whether a law that
regulates speech or expression is subject to intermediate or strict scrutiny,
the relevant inquiry is whether the law suppresses speech because of its
message,94 or, in contrast, reflects the legislature's pursuit of legitimate
goals unrelated to the message conveyed. 95
2. Title III: A Content-Neutral Law Subject to Intermediate Scrutiny
The language proscribing the disclosure of illegally intercepted
messages in Title III is not directed at suppressing the dissemination of
unpopular or governmentally disfavored ideas.96 Rather, the provisions
prohibit any use or disclosure of an illegally intercepted communication. 97
Title III prohibits disclosure, but it does so in a content-neutral manner
without singling out a particular message, subject, or viewpoint for
disfavored treatment.9" Therefore, the incidental effects of Title III on
speech must be judged under intermediate scrutiny, applying the threepronged formula devised in O'Brien.99
narrowly assure the continuing availability of draft cards than a law which prohibited their willful
destruction. Id. at 381. The governmental interest and the statute were limited to the
noncommunicative aspect of O'Brien's conduct. Id.at 381-82.
92. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).
93. Id. at 661.
94. Id. at 641. These laws pose the "inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance
a legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate the
public debate through coercion rather than persuasion." Id. Such "restrictions 'raise the specter that
the Government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace."' Id.
(quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991)).
95. Id. at 641; see also City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) (plurality
opinion) (determining that "[i]f the governmental purpose in enacting the regulation is unrelated
to the suppression of expression, then the regulation need only satisfy the 'less stringent' standard
from O'Brien," but "[i]fthe government interest is related to the content of the expression.... then
the regulation falls outside the scope of the. . .test and must bejustified under a more demanding
standard.").
96. Brief for Petitioners at 13, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (Nos. 99-1687,991728). The non-disclosure provisions of Title III "do not 'distinguish favored speech from
disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed."' Id. (quoting Turner,512 U.S. at
643).
97. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(l)(b)-(d) (2000).
98. See Brief for Petitioners at20,Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (Nos. 99-1687,
99-1728). Contra United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803, 806-11 (applying strict
scrutiny analysis to a statute which required cable companies to fully scramble sexually-oriented
programming or limit their transmissions because the regulation was a content-based restriction
targeting the primary effects of protected speech).
99. Brief for the United States at 23, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (Nos. 99-
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B. Boehner v. McDermott: A Logical Outcome
Following the O'Brienline ofreasoning, the Boehner Court determined
that the anti-disclosure provisions of Title III prohibit disclosure of all
illegally intercepted communications, "without regard to the substance of
the communication or the identity of the person who does the
disclosing."'0 0 Furthermore, the court held that the provisions reveal no
governmental interest in distinguishing between types of speech based on
content.' 0 '
Relying on the test laid down in O'Brien,the court determined that it
was evident that a substantial governmental interest existed in enacting the
anti-disclosure provisions that was unrelated to the suppression of free
expression."' According to the court, Title III's prohibition on disclosure
of illegally intercepted messages promotes rather than impinges freedom
of speech, and "damage to free speech is all the more severe when illegally
03
intercepted communications may be distributed with impunity.'
Therefore, applying intermediate scrutiny, the Boehner Court upheld the
constitutionality of the anti-disclosure provision in the statute."
C. Bartnicki v. Vopper: An Illogical Deviationfrom the
O'Brien Standard
The Supreme Court, in Bartnicki, agreed that the disclosure provision
of Title III was a content-neutral law of general applicability.' 5
Nevertheless, the Court failed to apply intermediate scrutiny under the
O'Brienframework.' 06 The Court stated that "the naked prohibition against
disclosures is fairly characterized as a regulation of pure speech."'0 7 Thus,
even though the Court recognized that the disclosure provision did not
distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech and was not justified

1687, 99-1728).
100. Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 468.
103. Id. "Eavesdroppers destroy the privacy of conversations. The greater the threat of
intrusion, the greater the inhibition on candid exchanges." Id.
104. Id. at 478.
105. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526 (2001).
106. Id. at 526-29. Justice Rehnquist addressed this ambiguity in the Court's reasoning by
stating "[t]he Court correctly observes that these are 'content-neutral laws of general applicability'
which serve recognized interests of the 'highest order' ....It nonetheless subjects these laws to
the strict scrutiny normally reserved for governmental attempts to censor different viewpoints or
ideas." Id. at 544 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 526.
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by reference to the content of the messages, the Court applied a heightened
level of scrutiny normally reserved for content-based statutes. 08
IV. LEGALLY OBTAINED, TRUTHFUL INFORMATION: THE SUPREME
COURT'S MISAPPLICATION OF FIRST AMENDMENT PRECEDENT

The Supreme Court's justification in Bartnicki for failing to apply
intermediate scrutiny under O'Brien stems from its reliance on cases
involving the publication of legally obtained, truthful information about
matters of public concern.0 9 It is well established that government officials
may not punish the publication of information that is truthful and has been
legally obtained."0 This proposition, however, does not apply when the
information has been secured through illegal means. 11' Furthermore, the
line of cases supporting this principle does not suggest that "strict scrutiny
is required where a law is addressed equally to all speakers and prohibits
disclosure not because of the subject matter involved, but because of the
manner in which the information was acquired."".
A. The DailyMail Principle:Establishinga Standardfor the
Publicationof Legally Obtained,Truthful Information
In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,"' a television news reporter
broadcasting a story concerning the guilty pleas of six men to the crimes
of rape or attempted rape, also broadcast the name of the seventeen yearold victim." 4 The name of the victim was obtained by reviewing the
indictments of the assailants, which were public records available for
general inspection."'S The victim's father brought an action against both
the reporter and the television station,116 asserting that the disclosure of his

108. Id. at 544 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
109. See Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524,533-36 (1989); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443
U.S. 97,102-03 (1979); Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829,838-39 (1978);
Okla. Publ'g Co. v. Oklahoma, 430 U.S. 308,311-12 (1977); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S.
469, 495-96 (1975).
110. Bartnicki v. Vopper, No. 3:CV-94-1201, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22517, at *10 (M.D.
Pa. June 14, 1996). It is "well-established that where the media lawfully obtains truthful
information about a matter of public significance or concern, government officials may not
constitutionally punish the publication of that information absent the need to further a government
interest of a higher order." Id.
111. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 54546 (Rehnqulst, C.J., dissenting).
112. See Brief for Petitioners at 25, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (Nos. 99-1687,

99-1728).
113.
114.
115.
116.

420 U.S. 469 (1975).
Id. at 472-74.
Id. at 472-73.
Id. at 474.
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daughter's name violated a Georgia law prohibiting the publication of the
identity of rape victims."'
The Supreme Court held that the government may not impose sanctions
on the publication of truthful information that is open to public
'inspection."'The Court proclaimed that such records, by their very nature,
are of interest to those concerned with the administration of government
and, hence, the freedom of the press to publish that information is of vital
importance." 9 The Court concluded that the burden of protecting private
information revealed during judicial proceedings was on the states, rather
than the press. 20 Therefore, the press could not be sanctioned for
publishing truthful information once it had been disclosed in court
documents open to public inspection.''
The tension between First Amendment and privacy principles was next
addressed by the Court in Landmark Communications,Inc. v. Virginia.'
Landmark involved a Virginia statute providing for the confidentiality of
judicial disciplinary proceedings and the punishment of any person who
divulged the identity of ajudge subject to such proceedings.' 23 The Court
reversed the conviction of a newspaper for publishing the name of ajudge
involved in confidential disciplinary proceedings.'24 The newspaper
ostensibly received the information regarding the judge from a participant
in the judicial inquiry who, in violation of the Virgina law, breached the
confidentiality ofthe commission."' The issue before the Court, then, was
"whether the First Amendment permits the criminal punishment of third
persons who are strangers to the inquiry, including the news media, for
divulging or publishing truthful information regarding confidential
proceedings of the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission."'26 The
Court concluded that the state's interests advanced by criminal sanctions
were insufficient to justify clear infringement of the First Amendment
guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press.' 27 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court declared that the newspaper could disseminate
"accurate factual information about a legislatively authorized inquiry" that
it had lawfully obtained.' 28

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

124.
125.

Id. at 471-72 (citing GA.CODE ANN.§ 26-9901 (1972)).
Id.at 495.
Id.
Id. at 496.
Id.
435 U.S. 829 (1978).
Id. at 830-31 n.1. (citing VA. CONST. art. VI, § 10; VA.CODEANN.§ 2.1-37.13 (1973)).
Id.at 834.
Id. at 832.
Id. at 837.

126.
127. Id. at 838.

128. Id. at 839.
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The contemporary rule regarding publication of legally obtained,
truthfil information was formulated in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing
Co.'29 In DailyMail, the Court considered a challenge to a West Virginia
statute prohibiting newspapers from publishing the name of any youth
charged as ajuvenile offender without the written approval of the juvenile
court. 3° Two West Virginia newspapers published the name and picture
of a juvenile who was accused of shooting and killing a fifteen year-old
high school student.' The newspapers had procured the juvenile's name
by interviewing witnesses, the police, and an assistant prosecuting attorney
at the school.' 32 The newspapers were indicted by a grand jury several
weeks after the publication, but the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals issued a writ prohibiting the prosecution and held that the statute,
violated the First Amendment by abridging the freedom of the press.' 33
In summarizing Cox and Landmark,the Supreme Court devised the
rule that if the press "lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter
of public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish
publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of
the highest order."' 34 Applying this form of strict scrutiny to the facts in
Daily Mail, the Court held that the information published by the
newspapers was legally obtained, concerned a matter of public
significance and was truthful.' Furthermore, the state's interest in
protecting the anonymity of the juvenile offender did not further a state
interest of the "highest order."' 36 Accordingly, the Court affirmed the West
decision holding that the statute
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals'
37
violated the First Amendment.
Finally, in FloridaStar v. B.J.F.,'38 the Supreme Court adopted and
further clarified the Daily Mail principle. Florida Star involved the
Court's review of the constitutionality of a Florida statute that made it
unlawful to 'print, publish, or broadcast... in any instrument of mass

129. 443 U.S. 97, 98 (1979).
130. Id. at 98 (citing W. VA.CODE § 49-7-3 (1976)).
131. Id.at99-100.
132. Id. at 99.
133. Id. at 100. The court determined "that the statute operated as a prior restraint on speech
and that the State's interest in protecting the identity of the juvenile offender did not overcome the

heavy presumption against the constitutionality of such prior restraints." Id.
134. Id. at 103.
135. Id. at 103-04
136. Id. at 104. The Court asserted that "[i]f the information is lawfully obtained, as it was
here, the state may not punish its publication except when necessary to further an interest more
substantial than is present here." Id.
137. Id. at 106.
138. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
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communication' the name of the victim of a sexual offense."' 39 A
newspaper obtained the identity of an alleged rape victim from an
unredacted police report that was inadvertently placed in the pressroom of
the Sheriffs office.14 The newspaper published a story concerning the
alleged rape and included the name of the victim in the article. 14 1 The
alleged victim subsequently filed suit against The FloridaStar and the
Sheriffs Department,
asserting that both had negligently violated the
42
Florida statute. 1
143
The trial court found The Florida Star liable under the statute;
however, the Supreme Court reversed and concluded that the Daily Mail
rule applied and that imposing liability on the newspaper did not further
a state interest of the highest order. 4 4 According to the Court, "[w]here...
the government has failed to police itself in disseminating information, it
is clear under Cox Broadcasting... and Landmark Communicationsthat
the imposition of damages against the press for its subsequent publication
can hardly be said to be a narrowly tailored means of safeguarding
anonymity.' 4 5
The Court determined the statute to be facially underinclusive in that
it did not prohibit the spread of a victim's identity by means other than
publication in an instrument of mass communication. 146 This determination
rendered the selective ban on dissemination incapable of accomplishing its
stated purpose of maintaining the privacy and safety of sexual assault
victims.147
B. Bartnicki v. Vopper: Ignoringthe Daily Mail Principle
The DailyMail principle establishes that truthful information of public
concern may be published when it has been "legally obtained."' 14 In
Bartnicki,the Supreme Court determined that the media outlet's access to
the taped message was obtained lawfully, even though the information had
been illegally intercepted by another party.' 49 This proposition runs
139. Id. at 526 (citing FLA.

STAT.

§ 794.03 (1987)).

140. Id. at 527. Signs existed in the press room making it clear that the names of rape victims
were not a matter of public record and thus were not to be published. Id. at 546 (White, J.,
dissenting).
141. Id. at 527.
142. Id. at 528.
143. Id. at 528-29. The plaintiff settled with the Sheriff's Department for $2500 prior to trial.
Id. at 528.

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 537.
Id. at 538.
Id. at 540-41.
Id.
Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979).
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 525 (2001).
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counter to language established by the Court in FloridaStar. In Florida
Star,the Court asserted that when sensitive information is in private hands,
the government may forbid its nonconsensual acquisition, and any
'15
"information so acquired" is "outside the Daily Mail principle."
Additionally, it seems illogical to conclude that information is legally
obtained when the source of the information breaks the law by placing the
information in the publisher's hands.151 Moreover, the Court's conclusion
that the information had been legally obtained is antithetical to Congress'
goal of protecting the privacy of communications through enactment of
anti-disclosure provisions in Title III.5 In essence, the Court condones the
laundering of illegally intercepted messages through individuals who did
not take part in the initial interception.' "Given the ease with which the
identity of the intercepting party can be concealed, Title III would lose
much of its force if the only means of preventing invasions into the
sanctity of private communications were prosecution of the illegal
interceptor himself."' 54
C. Strict Scrutiny and the DailyMail Principle:The Supreme Court's
Misapplicationof the ProperStandardofReview
Leaving the issue of whether the information was legally obtained
aside, the standard of review adopted in Bartnicki is further at odds with
the Daily Mail principle. The form of strict scrutiny applied in the Daily
Mail line of cases is the appropriate mode of analyzing statutes that
discriminate both on the basis of content and on the basis of the speaker.
A statute that prohibits speech only on particular subjects and allows
disclosure of information on specified subjects by anyone other than the
mass media, is subject to the "most exacting level of First Amendment
scrutiny," '5 5 because it is hostile to the message conveyed and poses an
inherent danger to free expression.' 56
The challenged non-disclosure provisions in Title III, as discussed
above, do not single out speech for any special prohibition; they prohibit
150. FloridaStar, 491 U.S. at 534.
151. Bartnicki,532 U.S. at 548 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
152. Congress determined that the growth of communications technology had been
accompanied by "the widespread use and abuse of electronic surveillance techniques," through
which "privacy of communication is seriously jeopardized" and every "spoken word relating to
each man's personal, marital, religious, political, or commercial concerns can be intercepted by an
unseen auditor and turned against the speaker to the auditor's advantage." S. REP.No.90-1097, at
67 (1968), reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2154.
153. Brief for the United States at 44, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (Nos. 991687, 99-1728).
154. Id.
155. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 661 (1994).
156. Id.
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any kind of use or disclosure of an illegally intercepted communication.'5 7
Furthermore, the provisions do not preclude certain persons or groups
from disseminating illegally intercepted messages, but rather prohibit "any
person" from disclosing such messages.'58 Unlike the statutes in Florida
Star and its predecessors, which forbade the publication of particular facts
and focused on speech itself, Title III's anti-disclosure provisions are
content and speaker neutral and thus should have been analyzed under
intermediate scrutiny rather than the Daily Mail strict scrutiny standard. 59
D. The FirstAmendment and Content-NeutralLaws of
GeneralApplicability
A significant factor in evaluating First Amendment claims is whether
a content-neutral law of general applicability applies. 6 In Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co., 6' the Supreme Court recognized that generally
applicable laws are not subject to strict scrutiny.'62 Cohen involved a
newspaper that obtained public court records concerning a Democratic
political candidate from a Republican activist in exchange for a promise
of confidentiality.' 63 The newspaper subsequently published the name of
the activist and his connection to the campaign of the .Republican
opposition as part of its stories concerning the Democratic candidate.'"
The activist sued the newspaper for failing to honor its promise of
confidentiality
and the Daily Mail principle was raised in defense by the
65
newspaper.

157. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c)-(d) (2000).

158. Id.
159. Brief for the United States at 21-23, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (Nos. 991687, 99-1728). Chief Justice Rehnquist rebuked the majority in Bartnicki for invoking strict
scrutiny by stating:
These laws are content neutral; they only regulate information that was illegally
obtained; they do not restrict republication of what is already in the public
domain; they impose no special burdens upon the media; they have a scienter
requirement to provide fair warning; and they promote the privacy and free speech
of those using cellular telephones. It is hard to imagine a more narrowly tailored
prohibition of the disclosure of illegally intercepted communications, and it
distorts our precedent to review these statutes under the often fatal standard of
strict scrutiny.
Bartnicki
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 548 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
See TurnerBroad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 662.
501 U.S. 663 (1991).
Id.at 670.
Id. at 665.
Id. at 666.
Id. at 668-69.
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The Supreme Court held that DailyMailwas inapplicable and that the
case was controlled by the "well-established line of decisions holding that
generally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply
because their enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its
ability to gather and report the news."' 66 Thus, the Court concluded that
stricter scrutiny should not be applied to enforcement of general laws
against the press than what would be applied to enforcement against other
persons or organizations. 67
Cohen demonstrates that strict scrutiny does not apply to generally
applicable laws even when liability is attached to disclosure of truthful
information of public importance, such as the identity of the source of
information. 6 ' The Supreme Court in Bartnicki, however, essentially
ignored the rule established in Cohen.69 The Court correctly recognized
that the disclosure provisions in Title III were content-neutral laws of
general applicability, but nonetheless subjected the statute "to the strict
scrutiny normally reserved for governmental attempts to censor different
viewpoints or ideas."' 7 ° Accordingly, the Supreme Court appears to have
misapplied established precedent by adopting the Daily Mail line of
reasoning to justify imposition of strict scrutiny where content-neutral
restrictions on speech need pass only intermediate scrutiny.' 7 '
V. COMPETING INTERESTS: PRIVACY VS. FREE SPEECH AND THE

SUPREME COURT'S UNFAIR BALANCING ACT
A. Bartnicki v. Vopper: ErodingPrivacyRights andHinderingthe
FreeExpression of Ideas
In Bartnicki, the Supreme Court, faced with the difficult task of
balancing free speech and privacy concerns, sided with the former interest

166. Id. at 669. The Court declared that "it is... beyond dispute that 'the publisher of a
newspaper has no special immunity from the application of general laws. He has no special
privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others."' Id. at 670 (quoting Associated Press v.
NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937)).
167. Id. at 670.
168. Brief for the United States at 25, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (Nos. 991687, 99-1728); see also Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1961) (determining that
"general regulatory statutes, not intended to control the content of speech but incidentally limiting
its unfettered exercise, have not been regarded as the type of law the First... Amendment forbade
Congress ...to pass, when they have been found justified by subordinating valid governmental
interests").
169. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 548 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 544 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
171. Id. (Rehnquist, C.L, dissenting).
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as opposed to the latter.'" In considering the balance, the Court
determined that the interest in publishing matters of public importance
trumped the interest in protecting privacy.' The Court's swift dismissal
of privacy concerns in favor of the media outlet's free speech rights is
contrary to Congress's clear intent in Title III to protect the privacy of
communications from the use and disclosure of surreptitiously intercepted
private messages.' 74 The Court's decision not only tramples the privacy
rights of private citizens, but it is also incompatible with its goal of
protecting free speech in that it exacerbates the degree to which such
intrusions inhibit the free exchange ofthoughts and ideas.175 "Ifindividuals
lack assurance that the law will protect the confidentiality of their
conversations, their willingness to speak candidly will necessarily
suffer.', 176 Thus, a statutory scheme that punishes interceptors of private
communications, but allows the confidential message to be disclosed with
impunity by third parties that did not participate in the initial interception,
hardly protects privacy and fails to promote free speech.
In Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises,177 the Supreme
Court asserted:
The essential thrust of the First Amendment is to prohibit
improper restraints on the voluntary public expression of
ideas; it shields the man who wants to speak or publish when
others wish him to be quiet. There is necessarily, and within
suitably defined areas, a concomitant freedom not to speak
publicly, one which serves the same7 ultimate end as freedom
of speech in its affirmative aspect. 1
The First Amendment value in the choice not to speak publicly is
advanced by Title III's prohibition of the use and disclosure of illegally
intercepted messages. It supports this value by protecting against the
"magnified harm that results when any illegally intercepted conversation
is disseminated to awider audience." 79 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's

172. Id. at 532-34.
173. Id. at 534.
174. S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 66-67 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2118, 2153-54.
175. Brief for the United States at 34, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (Nos. 991687, 99-1728).
176. Id.
177. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
178. Id. at 559 (quoting Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 294 N.E.2d 250, 255
(1968)).
179. Brief for the United States at 39, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (Nos. 991687, 99-1728).
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unfair balancing act in favor of the media's free speech rights effectively
neutralizes the First Amendment right not to speak publicly. 80
B. Factorsto Considerin Weighing the Competing Interests
The Court's decision in Bartnicki defends and even encourages the
evasion of Title III's anti-disclosure provisions. Concomitantly, the
Court's decision hinders the First Amendment rights of the parties to the
conversation including the right not to speak publicly. In weighing the
competing interests, the Court failed to consider several factors that favor
protection of the privacy interests of the parties to the private
communication. First, the Court failed to consider the subjective
expectations of privacy the parties had in their discussion.181 In United
States v. Nixon, ' 2 the Supreme Court held that an individual's
"expectation of... the confidentiality of his conversations" is a matter "to
which we accord deference for the privacy of all citizens."' 83 Surely an
individual communicating on a wireless device expects the contents of the
conversation to be kept confidential or at least not be recorded and later
disseminated to the world at large. Furthermore, the Court did not consider
objective expectations of privacy concerning the confidentiality of
communications occurring over wireless transmissions."8 4 Final
consideration should have been given to whether any important purpose
that discloses the information could serve instead to be accomplished
through alternative measures that would impinge less on privacy.'85
It is clear that, based upon both subjective and objective expectations
ofprivacy, parties to a wireless communication and reasonable persons not
participating in the communication expect that such conversations will not
be intercepted and subsequently disseminated to the world. Additionally,
public debate and political discourse are alternative measures that impinge
less on privacy than public disclosure.

180. "At the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide

for him or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence."
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514,553 (2001) (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (quoting Turner Broad.
Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994)).
181. Strossen, supra note 38, at 2111.
182. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
183. Id. at 708.
184. Strossen, supranote 38, at 2111.
185. Id.
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C. Amending Title III to Comport With the Goal of Protectingthe
Privacy of Communications
In light of the decision in Bartnicki, Congress must amend the antidisclosure provisions of Title III so that any third person receiving the
contents of an illegally intercepted message is prohibited from disclosing
those contents. Such an amendment would fulfill Title III's original
86
purpose of protecting citizens from surreptitious invasions of privacy.1
A gaping hole is currently left in the statute that allows for the
"laundering" of intercepted communications by individuals engaged in
illegal wiretapping.' 87
VI. CONCLUSION

Balancing free speech and privacy rights is a complex process,
considering that presumptive preference for one set of rights leads to
presumptive violations of the other set of rights.' 88 Nevertheless, lines
must be drawn and, by enacting Title III, Congress clearly drew the line
in favor of protecting the privacy of communications. Such privacy is
essential if citizens are to think and act creatively and constructively. Fear
or suspicion that one's speech may be intercepted and subsequently
disseminated with impunity can have a seriously inhibiting effect upon the
willingness to voice critical and constructive ideas.
The Supreme Court has, however, seriously undermined Congress's
strict statutory scheme to secure the privacy of communications by
permitting the media to disseminate illegally intercepted messages when
the media was not involved in the initial interception. In reaching this
conclusion, the Court misapplies its own precedent by invoking strict
scrutiny analysis in reviewing content-neutral laws of general
applicability. This misapplication results in the Court not only trampling
upon privacy rights, but also hindering the First Amendment right not to
speak publicly. To alleviate the dangerous precedent set by the Court,
Congress should amend Title III so it is clear that third parties receiving
the contents of illegally intercepted messages and subsequently disclosing
those contents are in violation of Title III's anti-disclosure provisions.

186. S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 66-67 (1968), reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112,2153-54.
187. See Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (asserting that unless
disclosure is prohibited, there will be an incentive for illegal interceptions, and that without Title
III's anti-disclosure provisions, the government would have no means to prevent the disclosure of
private information because criminals could "launder" illegally intercepted messages and there
would be almost no force to deter disclosure).
188. Strossen, supra note 38, at 2111.
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